A b stra ct The way th at Mifare Classic sm art cards work has been un covered recently [2, 4] and several vulnerabilities and exploits have emerged. This paper gives a precise logical formalisation of the essentials of the Mifare Classic card, in the language of a theorem prover (PVS). The formalisation covers the LFSR, the filter function and (parts of) the authentication protocol, thus serving as precise docum entation of the card's ingredients and their properties. Additionally, the m athem atics is described th at makes two key-retrieval attacks from [2] work.
Introduction
Theorem provers provide machine support for the formalisation and verification of systems and their properties. They are used both for hardware and for soft ware. A theorem prover may be seen as a sceptical colleague that checks and documents all individual proof steps and helps with tedious details. There are several sophisticated interactive theorem provers around, such as Isabelle [3, 7] , Coq [6] , NQTHM [1] and PVS [5, 9] .
In this paper we (happen to) use PVS. But we do not rely on any special property or power of PVS. We shall try to abstract away from the specifics of PVS, and formulate results in the language of (dependently) typed higher-order logic, using a certain level of pretty printing. The point we wish to make is that using a theorem prover is useful (also) in the area of computer security, for a precise description and analysis of one's system. As such it may be used as part of precise documentation, or even as part of a certification procedure. As will be illustrated, this works well for relatively unsophisticated systems, like smart cards with low-level operations. The PVS formalisation is available on the web 1.
The formalisation presented in this paper is specific to the Mifare Classic card and so it does not carry over to other systems. There is little or no uniformity in (proprietory) cryptographic systems, and hence there can be no uniformity in their formalisations. In a broader context this paper sets out to show that formalisations contribute to the documentation and analysis of low-level security protocols. The method as such does apply to other systems. During initialisation a Mifare card and reader each feed certain (nonce) data into their LFSRs, see Section 5; afterwards they use their LFSR to produce a keystream by feeding it with 0s. This is captured by a special 'advance' function in PVS that has the number n:nat of inserted zeros as argument: advance : [s t a t e , nat ^ s t a te ] = A (r :sta te , n:nat) : sh iftN in (r , n , f i l l [n] (false) ) It forms an action with respect to the monoid of natural numbers since it satisfies: advance(r, 0) = r advance(r, n+m) = advance(advance( r ,n), m)
L fsrSize to a bit. For convenience we abbreviate this type of bit vectors as 's ta te ' in a PVS

A dding a filter function param eter
We remain a bit longer within the generic setting of LFSRs. We now add another parameter, namely a function filfu n : [ s t a t e^b it ] that produces an output bit for an arbitrary state. A basic (single) step in the Mifare initialisation phase of card and reader involves processing one input bit while producing one (encryp ted) output bit that is sent to the other side. There it is processed in a dual way, as described by the following two functions. Of course, many more definitions and properties may be introduced for such abstract LFSRs. We confine ourselves to what is needed in our logical theory of the Mifare Classic. It includes a function to generate keystream bits, in the following way. stream : [s t a t e , n:nat ^ b i t ] = A (r :sta te , n:nat) : filfu n (a d v a n ce(r,n)) It is used in a similar function cipher that not only produces keystream, but also the resulting state. It is defined with a dependent product type in 
sh iftin sen d 1 : [[s t a t e , b i t ] ^ [s t a t e ,b i t ]] =
|0|i |2|3|4|5|6|7|8|9 |1 0 |i i |1 2 |1 3 |1 4 |1 5 |1 6 |1 7 |1 8 |1 9|20 |2 1 |2 2 |2 3|24 |2 5 |2 6 |2 7 |2 8|29 |3 0 |3 1 |3 2|33 |3 4 |3 5 |3 6 |3 7|38 |3 9 |4 0 |4 1|42 |4 3 |4 4 |4 5|46 |4 7 1 F igure 1. Mifare Classic LFSR.
In PVS this becomes, due to a reverse listing of entries: MfCfeedback : [bvec[L fsrS ize] ^ b i t ] =
The representation that we have chosen is the one that is most convenient in formulating definitions and properties. Now we can properly instantiate the theory of the previous section and obtain the type for "Mifare Classic LFSR" as: MfClfsr : type = s t a t e [L fsrS ize, MfCfeedback]
We turn to the filter function for the Mifare Classic. It is constructed in several steps, via two auxiliary functions MfCfilfunA and MfCfilfunB that each produce one bit out of a 4-bit input. Such functions are usually described by 4 hexadecimal digits, capturing the conjunctive normal form. In this case we have MfCfilfunA = 0x26C7 and MfCfilfunB = 0x0DD3, which can be simplified to a disjunctive normal form:
MfCfilfunA(b3, b2, b1, b 0:b it) : b it = ( (-b3 A-b2 A-b1) V (b3 A-b1 Ab0) V (-b2 Ab1 A -b0) V (-b3 Ab2 Ab1) ) M fCfilfunB(b3, b2, b1, b 0:b it) : b it = ( (b3 A-b2 A-b0) V (-b3 A b2 A-b0) V (b3 A-b2 A b1) V (-b3 Ab2 Ab1) V (-b3 A-b2 A-b1) )
The LFSR and filter function of the Mifare Classic can now be depicted in Figure 2 . 
The Mifare Classic authentication protocol
When a card reader wants to access the information on a Mifare Card it must prove that it is allowed to do so. Conversely the card must prove that is a authentic card. Both security goals are accomplished by a mutual-authentication mechanism based on a symmetric-key cipher. Because Mifare Classic cards operate through radio waves, it is possible that more than one card is within range of a reader. To distinguish different cards, each card has a unique id that is send to the reader (step 0). This 32-bit uid also plays a role in the cipher.
The information on the Mifare Classic is divided into blocks. The reader starts an authentication session for a specific memory block (step 1). Each block is protected by a different 48-bit key that is known by both the card and the reader. Card and reader initialise their shift registers with this key Kbiock (step 2).
The card subsequently chooses a 32-bit challenge or card nonce (nC ). This card nonce is added (®) to the uid and the result is fed into the LFSR. Also the card nonce is send to the reader in the clear, which then also feeds n C ® uid into its LFSR.
Then it is up to the reader to pick a 32-bit reader nonce n R. This nonce is also fed into the LFSR. After each bit the output of the filter function is collected in the encrypted reader nonce {n R} (send_reader_nonce in step 8) .
Upon reception of the encrypted reader nonce {n R} the card performs the inverse operation of send_reader_nonce, that is receive_reader_nonce. At this moment (after step 10) the cipher is initialised. The keystream now consists of the output of the filter function after each shift of the LFSR. All further communication is encrypted by adding the keystream to the clear text. Decryption is simply adding the keystream to the cipher text. The reader responds to the card's challenge by sending the encrypted card nonce n C, or rather the encryption of the expression suc2(nC). The function suc is actually computed by another 16-bit LFSR that is used to generate the card nonces. The card can decrypt the reader's response and verify that it corresponds to the expected result. This establishes that the reader can correctly encrypt the challenge, which presumably means that the reader has knowledge of Kbiock and thus is allowed to access that block.
To complete the mutual authentication, the card returns the encryption of suc3(nC). The reader can verify that the card's response is properly encrypted, which implicitly established the authenticity of the card.
To show that a reader and a card can perform a successful mutual authen tication, we can show that after each step they are both in the same state. In Figure 3 this means that every Sn on the card side is equal to the S n on the reader side. For most steps this is easy, since the card and the reader perform identical operations. Only when the reader nonce is processed, do the card and reader operate differently. The following PVS theorem states the correctness property of this step. Our answer is that the formalisation explains the details-including assump tions and side-conditions-of the attacks and thus clearly demonstrates the pre cise vulnerabilities on which the attacks are built. This clarity may help to prevent or counter such vulnerabilities in similar situations.
T he tw o-table attack
The first attack that will be formalised comes from [2, § §6.3]. It exploits the fact that the filter function M fCfilfun acts on only twenty LFSR positions, which are all at regular, odd positions (9, 11, . .. , 47). Hence after shifting the LFSR two positions the filter functions gets very similar input. This attack proceeds as follows. Assume we have a certain amount of keystream (at least 12 bits long). The aim is to find "solutions", namely LFSR states that produces this keystream, via the filter function. The first step is to define appropriate types for this setting:
keystream 
T he odd-from -even attack
It is possible to improve upon the two-table attack when sufficiently many bits of the keystream are known. In the previous section we saw that subsolutions of even bits of the LFSR can be computed from the even bits of the keystream. Suppose we have an even subsolution of 48 bits. The following property specifies that a subsolution of 48 even bits corresponds to a given LFSR state.
StateAndEvens These observations lead to the following efficient attack. Suppose we have 58 bits of keystream, that is we have 29 bits of even and odd keystream each. Using the 29 bits of even keystream we do a depth-first search to find the even subsolutions of 48 bits using the extension method of Section 6.1. For each even subsolution we can compute the odd bits of the LFSR. These in turn determine the odd bits of the keystream, which can be matched against the observed odd keystream.
This attack is more efficient, because the odd subsolution is obtained directly from the even subsolutions (an O(1) operation) whereas in the two-table attack each even subsolution has to be matched against each odd subsolution (O(n2) when done naively, O (nlog(n)) using a sorting operation on the feedback values).
Conclusions
We have described the basic logical details of the Mifare Classic card, focussing on its vulnerabilities and on two exploits. In the theorem prover PVS we have proved essential correctness results, while abstracting away from for instance matters of efficiency.
Many of the details of the formalisation are inherently specific to the Mifare Classic card and its weaknesses. However, this work does show that formalisa tions are relatively easy to do and can be both precise and readable. This makes them a solid base for the documentation and analysis of cryptographic systems. Thus, this paper suggests to card producers that they do such formalisations themselves, before bringing a card onto the market.
